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THE INTEGRATION OF RESTITUTION IN THE
PROBATION SERVICES
Irving E. Cohen1
A search through the literature on probation produces little on
the subject of restitution as an element in probation services. The
implication would seem to be that restitution is of insufficient importance to merit attention, and is merely incidental to the probation services. Assuming that this implication exists in fact, it is
the writer's opinion that workers in this field are losing sight of
a factor in probation which can be employed much more constructively than it now is.
In the tortuous history of man's punishment of man, restitution has had an established position. It is an ancient institution.
In Biblical times, the offender against society paid for his crimes
in a quantitative sense, "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth."
But the Teutonic laws offered the injured party monetary satisfaction, and often compelled him to accept it. The crimes were
met by restitution, so that the penal law of ancient communities
was not a law of crimes; it was a law of torts. The person injured
proceeded against the wrongdoer by an ordinary civil action and
was compensated in money. Every sort of injury which one freeman might inflict on another could be atoned for by "bot"-a money
restitution paid to the injured man or his relations. The extent of
this restitution depended, firstly, upon the nature and degree of
the damage done and, secondly, upon the rank and importance of
the person injured. Every man had his class and value, and every
form of aggression against a freeman, from a wound to a blow
which deprived him of a single tooth, as well as the theft of anything he possessed, had its designated amount of restitution. The
amount varied with the different tribes, but the main principle of
restitution extended through all groups. Frequently, restitution
could not be paid in lump sum, and thus developed a system of payments, the rules of which arose more out of fear of retaliation than
from broad humane concepts. If restitution were not paid, vengeance would be sought and blood spilled.1 The Saxons could be
cruel enough when bot was not made. How barbarous these people
could be may be gleaned from the words of one monarch, "If there
be no bot, then his hands be cut off, or his feet, or both, according
as the deed may be; and if then he have wrought yet greater
wrong, then let his eyes be put out, or his nose and his ears and
the upper lip be cut off; or let him be
scalped, so that punishment
' 2
be inflicted and the soul preserved.
1 Probation Department, Court of General Sessions, N. Y. City.
1 Pollack and Maitland: History of English Law.
2 Thoree: Laws of Cnut.
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In Henry III's reign, the wrongdoer rarely was sent to prison.
At the plea roll, the custodiatur which sent him to jail was followed
at once by "Finem fecit per unam markam" (or whatever the sum
might be) and then came the names of those who acted as guarantors for such payments. The judges did not wish to keep the convicted offender in prison; they wished to make him pay restitution.3 The first stirrings of the common law origins of probation
can be detected in these times. But it is interesting to note that
this legal device of withholding imprisonment followed the concept
of restitution, although it was destined to give the latter its greatest impetus. For, although restitution is an ancient institution,
its modern practice was stimulated to a large degree by the development of the suspended sentence and probation.
Grounded as it is in the history of the handling of the convicted
offender, restitution is nevertheless regarded by many workers in
the field of probation as having no relation to it. They believe that
it belongs in the Sheriff's or Marshall's office, or in some collection
agency. They fail to see that, having endured through the centuries, it must possess an inherent worth to society, or it would
have been discarded along with other archaic ideas. It has endured
because it lends a constructive aspect to the probation process. As
a condition of probation, it is readily acceptable to the community,
inasmuch as it can be regarded as a sublimation of society's unconscious "lex talionis," with money as the symbol of retaliation. It
is a departure from the retaliation through physical punishment
of the past era, and is therefore in consonance with those humanizing processes which inhibit the expression of primitive emotions
of revenge and ostracism, and channelize them instead into controlled sublimations. However, it imposes a form of "mea culpa"
on the offender on probation without the degradation and hurt
that so often embitters a man against society and fixes him in criminal behavior. This has been the philosophy behind the emergence
of restitution in probation, and it is fast becoming a more accepted
method of treatment where probation, and not institutionalization,
is indicated. It is a philosophy which is articulated by the community's demand for the probationer "to make good what he had
stolen," or, as the formal report to the court expresses it, "The
complainant will be in accord with the court's efforts to establish
terms of restitution."
The very wording of the probation report, that the community
in the person of the complainant will be "in accord with the court's
terms of restitution," signifies the social aspects of restitution. It
is an authorization in duality: (1) To impress upon the offender
society's punitive power, and (2) to temper such power with com3 Pollock and Maitland: History of English Law.

RESTITUTION

passion. Society's disapproval of the social deviate thus becomes
articulated, and, at the same time, society does not lose one of its
members. How much more civilized and advanced our thinking
has become is clearly evident when we recall that not so long ago
we were maiming individuals for those very infractions of the
law for which we now ask restitution in money.
Although frequently restitution is a burden to the probation
worker, there are elements inherent in it that can be of definite
value to both the probationer and the probation worker. To the
probationer, the police and court experiences are usually traumatic
to a degree. He undergoes marked emotional strain and anxiety.
He can barely reconstruct the situation in the confusion and oppressive feelings of personal degradation and social ostracism. He
has a presentiment of punishment by imprisonment, the stigma
attached to it, and the worries over family distress. Probation with
restitution as a condition is a relief. At that point, probation and
restitution can best be interpreted, and the role of the probation
worker in relation to them can most readily relate itself. Where
the probationer has been helped to achieve an acceptance of his
responsibilities for restitution, there is a concurrent imposition
of self-discipline which is more valuable than an imposed discipline. It is carried over to his other responsibilities under probation, and lightens the task of supervising him. Attempts, therefore,
to win him over to an acceptance of full restitution, not as a forced
imposition, but as a goal in rehabilitation, merits our attention.
The benefits resulting therefrom are (1) a better relationship with the probation worker, (2) a greater awareness of
the meaning to him of probation, (3) a resolution of his inner
conflicts, arising from the forces within him rejecting restitution,
(4) the satisfaction he ultimately derives in a job well done, and
(5) decrease of tension and anxiety. It is a discipline society
expects us all to acquire-the payment of a just debt. Instead of
becoming a barren and vindictive form of punishment or a discipline imposed, it can be employed to foster self-help. For, as Judge
Perkins of the Boston Juvenile Court remarked, "The central controlling fact in the correction of people is that correction is selfcorrection, and that they have the final decision as to whether they
will or will not make the necessary effort. They decide whether
they will or they won't. We don't-To accomplish our purpose we
must get them to do something, not -merely do something for them;
for if they are to correct their faults, they must do it by selfdiscipline, and that involves systematic and persistent effort by
them.4'" It is a common experience of practitioners to observe the
keen pleasure expressed by probationers on liquidating their res4
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titution account-the sense of squaring themselves with society,
the satisfaction they derive in the -respect given to them by the
probation department, court and community; the relief from
anxiety.
The following case may serve to illustrate the point:
S. E., 53 years old, was placed on probation for 21/ years,
following his conviction of Attempted Grand Larceny, 2nd Degree.
By means of two forged promissory notes, he and a co-defendant
obtained a large sum of money from a firm with which he had done
business for several years. His participation in the offense was
related to his efforts to preserve his business during a period of
reverses. A condition of his probation was that he make restitution "in accordance with terms established by the Probation Department." On the day he was placed on probation, he was a sad
spectacle-depressed, bewildered and at a loss as to how to set
about making restitution of a sum of several thousand dollars. The
probation worker attempted to meet these basic realities with him:
probation for 21/ years, full restitution, no further conflict with
the law. After a full discussion of his financial capacities as a
commercial agent, an attempt was made to bring him to participate
in plans around the terms of his restitution payments. The nature
of these discussions, his participation in working out a plan satisfactory to him, tended to reduce his anxieties. It was thus possible,
through restitution, to establish a good relationship with the probationer, free him from tension, and help him to face reality.
Some time later, but early in his probation, he fell into arrears,
and was assailed by panic. Two months arrears brought him
threats of imprisonment from the complainant's attorney. When
S. E. received a letter from the Probation Department, requesting
him to appear on a day other than his usual reporting day, he said
a tearful goodbye to his family, and appeared at the office expecting to be sent to prison. When he realized that efforts were being
made to assist him, tension snapped and he burst into tears. When
it was explained to him that the terms of restitution could be readjusted to his income, he was relieved.
Thereafter, he was less tense and anxious about his restitution.
There is little question as to his liquidation of it. It would seem
that, in this case, restitution was used as a constructive tool, individualized to meet his particular needs-releasing him from the
enervating effects of his anxieties, which immobilized him.
An example of how restitution can become a destructive force
and impede progress on probation is the case of E. K., age 55, who
had been convicted of conspiracy involving a public utility where
he had been employed for many years. He was placed on probation
for three years, and ordered to make restitution of $1,000. Faced
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with permanent rejection by bonding companies, he felt stigmatized by probation, ashamed for his family and generally bitter.
The probation worker took the court order literally, and exerted
pressure to make him meet the restitution obligations. E. K. became increasingly antagonistic, and developed marked persecutory trends, until he burst all restraints, became hysterical, and
accused the probation worker of "railroading him to prison." He
continued payments, but never completed them.
From a restitution point of view, the case may be termed a
partial success, but restitution was employed in a vacuum. It could
have been used as an opening wedge in establishing a relationship
of trust, confidence and security. Actually, it was unconstructive,
both for the probationer and the worker. It forced the former
to retire into a state of inadequacy and the latter into an authoritarian role.
In another respect, restitution can be a helpful factor in probation. While the probationer is working out the terms of his restitution with the probation officer, the latter has an opportunity to
enter into the question of budgeting, an area not as yet fully exploited in probation services. It is common to a great many cases
that the offender has come into conflict with the law because of his
inability to live within his means. As he makes restitution, the
necessity for this may be woven into a budgetary practice, so that
the probationer acquires a clearer picture of income and expenditure. The careless dribbling away of surplus without realization
is replaced by a more methodical, systematic attempt to live within
one's means. The self-discipline developed by regular restitution
payments is carried over to the problem of living within a budget.
The combination of satisfying emotions around the knowledge of
being able to conform to the restitutional obligations; the ability
to plan one's expenditures and accumulate some savings, all tend to
give the probationer a sense of self-worth and self-rehabilitation
that is really enduring. Add to this the benefits to the probationer's family life when economic pressures are reduced, and we observe that the advantages flow to the members of the probationer's
family as well as to him.
The case of C. M. would seem to illustrate these points. Age
28, the father of two children, he was one of the co-defendants in
the public utility offense. Undisciplined and impulsive, C. M. was
constantly running into arrears in his restitution and rationalizing
his inadequacies by blaming his wife for the dissipation of funds.
Several questions had to be answered: (1) Was he resisting restitution as a condition of his probation, (2) What was the real extent of his earnings, (3) What was the wife's place in the situation, (4) Were there any other factors which might account for
the dissipation of funds.
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The first two questions answered themselves in that C. M. had
been making efforts at restitution for some time and had a comparatively small balance outstanding; that, as a skilled mechanic
employed in a war production plant, he was earning a very adequate wage. The third and fourth questions were answered when
both C. M. and his wife were invited for a discussion of the problem. C. M. expressed his belief in the masculine prerogative of
handing out varying sums of money to his wife from day to day,
retaining the balance. When C. M. finished work for the day, and
stopped for a beer with his fellow-workers, he would feel "rich"
with his excess funds and would treat others to drinks. It became
apparent that the problem called for the planning of a budget and
the setting aside of a definite amount for restitution payments.
C. M. and his wife were encouraged to jointly fix a budget, which
they agreed to try. The fact that the probationer thereafter liquidated his restitution and Mrs. M. stopped complaining seemed to
prove that it was the proper step. The final proof was Mrs. M.'s
ability to live within her means when she received an assigned
portion of his wages, after C. M. joined the merchant marine.
Restitution in this case was the wedge by means of which the
family was oriented to a planned financial basis.
Emphasizing the restitutional aspects of probation for its constructive elements, and thereby bringing about an integration
of both, would bring the cry that probation would be made a collection agency. On this ground, too many workers fail to see the
important use to which restitution can be put to win the cooperation of the community. Even ignoring the probationer's welfare,
which is a basic consideration and, next to the protection of society,
the raison d'tre of our work-probation itself derives a benefit
therefrom, even at the risk of being labelled a collection agency.
The community finds it difficult to understand probation theories
and subtleties. To gain its support we must give concrete evidence
of accomplishment. The recovery of $594,811.11 to the community
in criminal cases, as reported by one department 5 in ten yearsmost of them depression years, and the recovery to the community
in 1942 of $15,079.54 by another department 6 is easily understood
by the public. Probation thereby acquires a lustre that no amount
of theorizing can achieve for it. The average person is unfamiliar
with probation and is coldly objective. Even after hearing about
the sympathetic understanding, guidance, etc., that probation
brings to the probationer, he may still feel that the expenditures
made for the maintenance of this service are unjustified. He becomes an easy prey to demagogic appeal. One sure method of
5 Probation Department-Court of General Sessions, New York-Jan. 1927Dec. 1936.
6 Probation Department-Supreme Bench of Baltimore City.
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immunization is to be able to present to the public concrete evidence of the per capita cost of institutionalization as against the
per capita cost of probation or parole, and more effective is the
actual financial recovery through restitution. In the last analysis,
it is the complainant and others like him who constitute the community to whom we look for support.
A case in point is J. F. He is 39 years old and was placed on
probation for three years, following his plea of guilty to charges
that he had fraudulently obtained money from a check-cashing
service. He was intent on not making restitution if he could possibly avoid it by neglect, alibis and appeals to the complainant,
whom he induced to waive restitution. He was not a disciplinary
problem in any other respect. While he acknowledged his debt, he
would embark on superficial discussions and then proceed to ignore payments. When it was definitely established that he was
well able to make restitutional payments, and persuasions were
futile, two alternatives had to be faced: (1) To refuse to become a
collection agency for the complainant, and (2) to arraign J. F. as
a probation violator, with possible imprisonment for him, since,
in this case, there were no mitigating circumstances. He had
merely attempted to convince the complainant of his inability to
make-restitution, and the community in this instance, in the person
of the complainant, came first and needed protection. The probationer was cited for violation of probation and given a deadline
for complete restitution. This had the desired effect. He liquidated
his account. Probation came to mean something real to the complainant. The court received letters of his deep appreciation.
One might consider the possible extension of the concept of
restitution. It is not entirely visionary to contemplate the time
when prospective parolees will be required to make restitution as a
condition of parole, particularly where large sums of money were
involved in the offense. There is no real reason why society should
not impose a post-release restitutional obligation on offenders who
succeed in mulcting the public of large sums of money and manage
to hide their ill gotten gains from seizure until such time when they
are able to live a life of ease. They merely trade imprisonment for
a period of time in a gamble with constituted authority against the
discovery of their cache. They are released assured that their
wealth will be undisturbed and that they have discharged their
debt to society. But the real point is that they retain the advantages they first sought. Restitution may be a remedy.
It should be a part of a case work program, not a "hit and miss"
method of collections unrelated to the broader possibilities.

